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Volunteerism after the Tsunami: The Effects of Democratization 
Tiago Freire, J. Vernon Henderson, and Ari Kuncoro

 
Using three waves of survey data from fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia for 2005–09, 
the paper examines the determinants of local volunteer labor after the tsunami. Volunteer 
labor is the village public sector labor force for maintenance, clean-up and renovation of 
public capital. While also examining the effects on volunteerism of village destruction 
and trauma, pre-existing social capital, diversity, and aid delivery, the papers focuses on 
effects of democratization. The tsunami and massive international aid effort prompted the 
settlement of the insurgency movement in Aceh, which had led to suspension of local 
elections over the prior twenty or more years. Until 2006, village heads who call 
volunteer days were effectively selected by village elites, who may highly value the public 
facilities maintained by volunteer labor. With elections, volunteer days fall under the new 
regime, with democratically elected village heads calling fewer volunteer days, which 
may appeal more to the typical villager. Identification comes from pseudo-randomized 
differential timing of elections. 
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Volunteer labor in traditional societies is a key part of village life. There is no paid local 
public labor force to collect litter and sweep the roads, maintain village lands and 
pathways, and build and repair coastal barriers and irrigation and aquaculture channels. 
There is also no public labor force to repair or renovate village-provided public buildings 
such as mosques and village and fishermen’s halls. Buildings like schools and health care 
facilities are government provided. At times, there are construction monies for village-
provided buildings such as halls or mosques from outside sources. However, repairs, 
maintenance, and renovation are a different matter. In Indonesia, such local public labor 
activities are done through volunteer labor, where village males assemble several times a 
month, in a response to a call by the village head for a volunteer day. While volunteer 
days may be viewed as informal voluntary taxation (Olken and Siyokal 2011), they are a 
form of taxation that is central to village life.  
This paper studies volunteer labor in 190 coastal fishing villages in Aceh 
Indonesia in an unusual context, the years following the tsunami of late December 2004. 
The tsunami wiped out almost all buildings, housing, and boats and significant portions 
of the population in the villages we study and prompted a massive inflow of private aid to 
these villages, replacing most lost physical capital by the end of 2007. Most critically for 
this paper, the tsunami and aid gave high exposure to the twenty-plus year conflict 
between Aceh and the Indonesian central government and resulted in a settling of that 
conflict. That settlement prompted the introduction of formal elections in villages starting 
in 2006, with differential timing on the introduction of those elections from early 2006 to 
past early 2010.   
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This differential timing provides a potential opportunity to study the effect of 
village level democratization on volunteerism as recorded near the end of both 2007 and 
2009, with additional recall information on aspects of pre-tsunami volunteerism. While 
the effect of earlier democratization in other parts of Indonesia on other phenomena has 
been studied (Henderson and Kuncoro 2011 and Martinez-Bravo 2011), here we focus on 
a new outcome in the general literature on democratization, volunteer labor. Overall, 
democratization in Indonesia occurred in 1999, although regular elections of village 
heads started earlier, albeit in an overall national non-democratic context. But in Aceh the 
civil conflict and insurgency led to suspension of all formal elections. The tsunami and 
international exposure led to a declaration of a ceasefire and then a settlement of the 
conflict situation in Aceh in late 2005, with Aceh achieving considerable autonomy. In 
early 2006 the first formal, mandated elections for villages in Aceh in at least two 
decades were authorized, in line with the democratization that had occurred earlier in the 
rest of Indonesia. However as we will detail below in sections 1b and 3b, implementation 
of formal elections in villages was delayed in many districts and villages, helping with 
identification. 
What is the effect of democratization on volunteerism? A priori, given work by 
Dalbo, Foster, and Putterman (2010) or Bardhan (2000), we thought democratization 
might increase volunteerism.
2
 In experimental work, Dal Bo, Foster, and Putterman 
(2010) find that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when the 
policy is chosen democratically, as opposed to imposed exogenously. We find 
democratization is associated with reduced volunteerism. Relative to Dalbo et al., we 
                                                 
2. While some literature hints that “modernization” and the introduction of formal institutions might reduce 
social cooperation (Putnam’s 1995 lament on “bowling alone,” Persson and Tabelli 2000, and Costa and 
Kahn 2003), these analyses involve gradual changes over long periods of time. 
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note that pre-democratic volunteerism in our villages was not exogenously imposed; it 
occurred in a traditional village context.   
Prior to election reforms in early 2006, in most villages, village heads were 
chosen by a variety of informal mechanisms, with elites effectively selecting village 
heads. As such, volunteer days involved public labor choices made by heads selected by 
elites. Democratization introduced formal elections, whereby almost all former village 
heads are replaced. Villages having elections by the two time periods for which we have 
data (late 2007 and 2009) have about 35% lower volunteerism than villages yet to have 
elections and effects persist. We will argue that the effect is causal. While there may be 
competing explanations for the effect, we will argue that volunteerism declines because a 
democratically elected leader, relative to an elite leader, following preferences of the 
typical villager chooses fewer projects that involve volunteer labor. Thus the effect 
follows from a regime change. The outcome is consistent with the work of Martinez-
Bravo, Padró-i-Miquel, Qian, and Yaoo (2011), which finds that, in China after local 
election reforms, locally elected leaders are more responsive to the wants of villagers 
than leaders imposed from above. 
Is the association of differentially timed elections with lower volunteerism a 
causal effect of elections on volunteerism?
3
 We don’t have the context to nail an 
experimental causal effect and it is not clear under what circumstances such a context 
would arise. What we have is evidence that is suggestive of a causal relationship. In 
general, the magnitude of the relationship is the same with no village level controls 
                                                 
3. Under the Aceh autonomy laws passed after settlement of the civil conflict, villages receive a small grant 
(about $11,000 USA) from the provincial government, which in principle they could spend on paid labor. 
However this goes to villages whether they have had elections or not, so the differential effect of the 
introduction of elections is not related to government spending crowding out private giving (Andreoni 
1993). 
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versus extensive controls that affect volunteerism, suggesting the elections’ effects may 
be orthogonal to other factors. But the key is to argue that, as related to volunteer days, 
the timing of elections is pseudo-randomized. Formal elections are spread over at least 5 
years, driven in part by differential timing of when district and subdistrict governments 
push villages in their domain to have elections. This aspect is discussed in detail in 
section 3. The timing of village elections, beyond district fixed effects, is uncorrelated 
with observable village characteristics. Most critically, elections held in different years 
have the same effects on volunteerism, suggesting that unobservables affecting election 
timing do not influence election impacts on volunteerism. Finally, we also have placebo 
elections, which are informal “elections,” typically dominated by village elites held soon 
after the tsunami to replace village leaders who died. Such elections have no effects on 
volunteerism.  
In doing this analysis we can’t and shouldn’t completely divorce the paper from 
the unusual context of massive destruction and aid in post-tsunami Aceh. First, there are 
potentially direct effects of destruction on volunteerism. Public building that were 
destroyed were replaced by NGO’s with brand new buildings, potentially reducing the 
need for volunteerism for maintenance, while surviving public buildings generate a need 
for damage repair and maintenance. Destruction required reconstruction of the coastal 
line and barriers, mostly by volunteer labor. Second, it may be that differential 
destruction, differential existing social capital stocks and their destruction, and the 
massive aid process could all affect volunteerism and could as well influence the timing 
of elections. At a minimum we want to show that controlling for these factors does not 
affect the democratization results.   
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However, the context provides an opportunity to relate to other literatures on 
volunteerism. When we develop our model of election impacts, we will discuss the 
general demand and supply factors affecting volunteerism. When we discuss the effects 
of controls we will talk about explicit hypotheses in the literature that our results relate to. 
To give a taste of the issues here, we note that in the literature, volunteerism may be 
affected by village size and diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 
2003). Volunteerism may be affected by the aid and destruction process, with aid directly 
altering the opportunity costs and benefits of volunteering (Svennson 2000, Labonne and 
Chase 2008, Knack and Rahman 2007). Social capital and its destruction by the tsunami 
could affect volunteering by, say, altering the perceived social costs of not volunteering 
(Putnam 1995, Sobel 2002, Getler, Levine, and Miguel 2009).
4
 Later, in a section on 
controls, we will suggest specific hypotheses that our data may relate to.  
We start by describing the unusual context. Then we present a model of 
volunteerism, discuss the estimating framework, and analyze results. 
 
 
1. THE CONTEXT 
We look at the extent of destruction from the tsunami, aid delivery, and aspects of 
democratization relevant to the investigation. To keep a sequence of events, we start with 
items related to our controls, before turning to democratization. 
                                                 
4. There is a large literature on the best ways to deliver aid (Collier et al. 1997, Azam and Laffont 2003, 
Svennson 2003, Murrell 2002, Pederson 2001, Torsvik 2005, Kanbur and Sandler 1999, Easterly 2003, and 
Paul 2006), which is not really relevant here. The aid process in Aceh was generally unconditional and 
uncoordinated. The government agency overseeing the process, BRR [Executing Agency for the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias], largely defined its role as (1) a clearing house 
recording aid and (2) late in the process filling in ex post gaps with monies it administered from the 
(international) multi-donor fund.   
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(a) The shock: Destruction, relief, and our data 
The tsunami struck Aceh in late December 2004. After late winter and spring fieldwork, 
in the summer and fall of 2005, we surveyed village heads and local heads of the 
fishermen’s association (Panglima Laot) in 111 fishing villages. In the fall of 2007 and of 
2009, we resurveyed the 111 villages and added another 88 villages, which were further 
away from the capital Banda Aceh and were inaccessible in 2005. The intent was to cover 
the universe of fishing villages as we moved some distance south and north-east of the 
capital Banda Aceh, as explained in the appendix. Our villages are in the five districts 
most affected by the tsunami and account for about 30% of all house aid in Aceh, with 
urban Banda Aceh accounting for much of the rest. The timing of the tsunami, fieldwork, 
and surveys are in appendix table A1. One set of surveys focuses on village level 
characteristics and outcomes. As noted in the appendix, they ask in detail about the public 
and private capital destruction and the aid process and then ask background questions on 
village demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table A2 in the appendix gives 
statistics on village characteristics we use in estimation. For these questionnaires, in the 
majority of cases, the official interviewee is the village head, who is also the respondent 
to the PODES, a tri-annual census of Indonesian village populations and facilities. But 
often multiple village officials were present and village heads were not shy about asking 
other prominent villagers to supply or confirm information.
5
  
The tsunami devastated coastal cities and villages. Table 1 presents an overview 
of destruction and aid in 190 of our villages with complete information, using different 
                                                 
5. In 2007, for example, 62% of the time the official respondent was the village head, 25% the secretary, 
and the rest at least both. But often the mullah or head of the local fisherman’s association would drop by 
and participate in the interview. Surveyors generally did not record this, as these are not village officials per 
se. 
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data sources discussed in the appendix. Table 1 reveals the nature of the shock affecting 
villages. Destruction is massive. In 104 villages around Banda Aceh surveyed in 2005, 
under 50% of the population survived; in the expanded set used in the paper the survival 
rate is 75%. The destruction of physical capital in the overall sample was almost 
universal, given both the earthquake that created the tsunami and the wave following 20-
30 minutes later. Survival rates of houses for the overall sample averaged 9.7% and of all 
public buildings 16%.   
TABLE 1 about here 
The immediacy and extent of aid is impressive. As we will note below, aid was 
private, most done directly by NGO’s with some foreign government monies funneled 
through a temporary agency in Aceh set up by the national government. District and 
subdistrict governments did not play a role in organizing and delivering aid, although 
they are responsible for organizing village elections. In terms of aid, in our villages, 
157% of needed houses had been replaced by 2009. Overall in Aceh, aid gave 134,000 
houses for 120,000 houses destroyed (Xinhua News Service, February 1, 2009), despite 
the reduction in population. For public buildings, 100% of destroyed buildings had been 
replaced by late 2009, a good rate given the loss of village populations. Later we will use 
information on public buildings destroyed and surviving as measures that might influence 
the demand for volunteerism. Within three years of the tsunami, the aid process had 
accomplished what it intended—to replace the entire per household physical capital 
stock. To deliver aid, private NGO’s contracted with villages. Aid delivery takes up 
village head time and the need and energy for calling of volunteer days, so it may be 
important to control for the extent of aid. To measure the extent of outside intervention in 
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a village, we use the RAN [Recovery Aceh-Nias] database to count aid projects in a 
village [http://rand.brr.go.id/RAND/reference]. From table 1 there were on average 11 
different “first level implementers,” or different aid agencies actually delivering aid on 
the ground per village, each with different projects, each negotiated separately. The mean 
number of projects from these aid agencies was about thirty-two in 2009.   
(b) Democratization 
For twenty years prior to the tsunami, Aceh had an insurgency movement, the Free Aceh 
Movement [GAM]. The national government imposed effective military rule, with 
villages caught in the struggle between the army and the insurgents. While free, formal 
elections in villages in Indonesia commenced in 1979, in Aceh these were suspended. 
Village heads were chosen and certified by the subdistrict (kecamatan) government, in 
close consultation with the village council of elders (tuhapeut), who represent the elites in 
the village. The few elections that occurred were irregular in timing and informal, usually 
with lack of contestation, secret ballots, and/or full voting rights; they tended to rubber-
stamp the selection of the head chosen by elites. An election, for example, might involve 
a show of hands by males in a post-Friday prayer meeting at the mosque. The 
introduction of regularly scheduled, contested, and certified elections with secret ballots 
and full voting rights followed major election reforms enacted by early 2006, after 
settlement of the insurgency.  
Table 2 shows that elections phased in over time. During 2006 and 2007, 47.4% 
of our villages had formal elections under the new procedures and another 23.1% in the 
next two years. Still by the end of 2009, 29.5% still had no formal election. All remaining 
villages were slated for elections in 2010. This differential timing will be utilized in 
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estimation and arises in part from the differential timing of pressure from subdistrict and 
district governments to schedule local elections. We devote considerable space to 
analyzing timing in section 3c. The short version is that no village observables affect 
timing, other than the district a village is in. Some districts placed greater weight on 
having earlier elections. While we cannot argue that election timing is exogenous to the 
village, we will argue that our results indicate that the unobservables affecting timing do 
not affect volunteerism.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Elections appear not to be kind to old leaders, although we don’t know the extent 
to which such leaders stood for election (but then that would be endogenous). At the end 
of 2009, under 15.5% of old village heads remained in office and under 22.7% of those 
(i.e., five) were in office after an election (table 2). We believe that this means that formal 
elections shift power from a narrow set of village elites to the more general population, 
and the nature of village heads changes. In particular, their education level, as measured 
by high school completion or not, changes. As the bottom rows of the table show, village 
heads in 2009 are much better educated than pre-tsunami heads overall, and especially 
those still in office in 2009.
6
 Related but not in the table, in 2009, 66% of heads elected 
post-tsunami have high school or more, while only 48% of non-elected have high school 
or more. We will investigate whether this change in education level itself affects 
volunteerism. 
 
                                                 
6. In fact, some districts under the election reforms in principle required village heads to have a high school 
education. However the village can argue that no available person meets that criterion or that a candidate is 
worthy anyway. There seems to be a sense that the requirement itself is not binding, but villagers are opting 
for more educated heads. 
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2. CONCEPTUALIZING VOLUNTEER LABOR UNDER DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
In formulating the approach, we expect the type of village head to differ between 
a traditional regime and a democratic one. In a traditional regime where the village 
council has a key role in choosing a village head, we believe that the village head 
generally is chosen from village elites represented by the council and familiar to the 
subdistrict government. In contrast, under democracy, the village head is more likely to 
be chosen from the village at large and to represent more general interests (cf., Martinez-
Bravo et al. 2011). These two types of village heads may have very different valuations 
of projects utilizing volunteer labor, and we examine one characterization. To incorporate 
individual participation decisions, we adopt a simple version of Foster and Rosenzweig 
(2005). Although we model a representative village, at the end we note how different 
variables might represent demand or supply conditions that would vary across villages.  
Suppose villagers are heterogeneous in their preferences for any projects requiring 
public labor. Villagers are ordered uniformly on the unit interval in terms of the value, x , 
they place on any public service produced with volunteer labor. There is a set of possible 
public projects where the base valuation of a project i  is 0iC  , and projects differ in 
their iC ’s from low to high. There are two political regimes, elite controlled ( e ) and 
democratic ( d ). The question is if, say, all high valuation projects are chosen under both 
regimes, how does the equilibrium lower cut-off value jC  differ for projects chosen 
under regime  vs. e d ? Which regime has a lower cut-off and thus potentially chooses 
more projects? Any individual has a valuation for a project of , [0,1], 1L xC x   . L is 
total volunteer labor devoted to a project and thus gives the endogenous scale of any 
project.  
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For the volunteer process, to simplify, we assume a volunteer provides a fixed 
amount of effort at a cost b . We start by assuming that b is the same for all villagers. 
Heterogeneity in b will help explain, in an obvious way, individual participation 
differences and could arise from differences in personal or psychic costs of participation 
and the like. Of course, heterogeneity in b  makes the full village solution more difficult. 
But if, say, b  increases with x  but at a slower rate, our comparisons of equilibria under 
the two regimes will not be qualitatively affected.  
For the base case, a person volunteers if their private marginal product exceeds 
cost, or 1
iL C x b
   . If a project is announced, total volunteer labor is (1 )L s N  , 
where N is the mass of people in the village and s is the lowest valuation person to 
volunteer from the unit interval of valuations x (assuming 1
iL C b
   ). This lowest 
valuation person to volunteer from the unit interval is given by the equation 
    1 1[ (1 )]i iL C s N s C s b
      .  (1a) 
This defines an implicit function  
(1 )
( , ; ),
(1 )
L i
ds s dC
s s C b N
s s C

  

. (1b) 
Note also that / 0sdb dC  . One might impose that any project has a minimum required 
labor L  or maximum ,s  
     (1 )L s N  .    (2) 
If this is imposed, s cannot be exceeded if a project is to be viable.   
In the first regime under which projects are proposed, a village head is chosen from 
village elites. To make our point, we assume village elites have the highest valuations for 
public projects and occupy the interval [ ,1], 1/ 2e ex x  . Other work shows that public 
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good composition changes with electoral reforms in the context of caste and landlessness 
in India (Foster and Rosenzweig 2005 and Munshi and Rosenzweig 2010). In Aceh there 
are no castes, and the reform is to have elections, not to shift the balance of power within 
an election regime. More critically, the range of relevant services involved is narrower, 
mostly maintenance, cleaning, or renovation of village public facilities and areas 
including docking facilities and aquaculture channels, which have more appeal to elites 
who intensively use such facilities. This characterization is based on our extensive 
fieldwork, which also involved professionals who grew up in Aceh; it is broadly 
consistent the case studies reported in Evers (2000). We assume that, in the elite regime, 
elites choose all projects desired by the person with preferences .ex  Under a democratic 
regime, d , we assume the median voter dominates, so 1/ 2dx  .
7
 
The decision maker in each regime can only muster volunteer labor if he also 
volunteers (after all he must lead the volunteer group). He only does that if the total 
benefits to him of having the project equal or exceed his cost of volunteering, or 
[ (1 )] , ,i jN s C x b j e d
   . This defines a second implicit function defining the lowest 
valuation project announced by the village head:  
   ( , / ; ), (1 )j
dC ds
C C s b x n s s
C s
   .  (3) 
Note for this also that / 0, / 0s sdC db dC dx  . 
In figure 1 we graph an example of the general forces at work. The negatively 
sloped equation (1b) and positively sloped (3) are graphed in figure 1 in ,s C  space. The 
graph is drawn for specific parameters, but the results are general. The graph uses 
                                                 
7. Either volunteer labor is the only election decision, or preferences on other election dimensions are 
ordered in the same fashion on the unit interval. 
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(0,1)C , 0.5, 1, 10, and two values of , 0.5 and 0.8d eb N x x x      . Equation (3) 
but not (1a) shifts out as 
jx  increases. The intersection of the two curves gives the 
minimum value of , jC C , for the lowest quality project chosen, and the equilibrium 
associated , js s , for that project (which involves the lowest volunteerism among all 
projects chosen under regime j ). Projects with 'sC  above jC  
are chosen and have higher 
participation as given by the declining values of s  as one moves up the downward 
sloping curve for equation (1b).  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The graph illustrates the general comparison of the elite versus democratic 
regime. Under the democratic regime, 0.5dx  , sd = 0.5 and Cd = 0.283. Shifting to an 
elite regime, 0.8ex  , sj = 0.615 and C j = 0.202. Thus, under an elite regime, all 
projects that occur under a democratic regime are also undertaken (where the level of 
volunteerism is the same for each specific project across regimes). But more and lower 
value projects are undertaken in an elite regime, each with lower levels of volunteerism. 
Thus total projects and total volunteerism are higher in the elite regime. The extent of this 
shift, or increase in total projects, could be hindered if there is a minimum labor 
requirement, or s , since lower value projects induce less volunteerism.   
In terms of typical demand and supply factors typically associated with 
volunteerism, villages could differ in their demand for projects, based on the range and 
distribution of 'sC . For example, in our context, if more public buildings survive in a 
village, those are items where maintenance is required via volunteer labor, relative to a 
village receiving new facilities that have yet to age. If the village head’s energy is 
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diverted to the aid process (akin to Knack and Rahman 2007), that could reduce the 
efficiency ( ) with which volunteer labor is used. On the supply side, there should be 
differences in typical costs on volunteering in a village, b , apart from within village 
differences. Higher stocks of social capital could reduce perceived costs of volunteering 
or working with others in the village towards common goals. Akin to Svennson (2000) 
and Labonne and Chase (2008), more aid delivered in a village, although coming from 
outside aid agencies, could increase market opportunities in the local transport and food 
service sector, raising costs of volunteering, or divert villagers’ energies in negotiating 
over the division of aid. Higher costs, b , for the village cause both curves in figure 1 to 
shift up, meaning that the minimum 
jC  
is increased (fewer projects under either regime). 
While the impact on 
js  is ambiguous, total volunteerism declines—fewer projects with 
less volunteerism for each. 
 
3. THE DETERMINANTS OF VOLUNTEERISM ACROSS VILLAGES 
The key outcome in this study is volunteer days called in the last month, where the 
village head calls volunteer days up to twice a week during the month. In the village level 
surveys in 2007 and 2009, we ask whether volunteer days were called in the last month 
and, if so, how many. In 2007, we also asked how many days typically were called pre-
tsunami in a month. Table 3 gives some basic numbers. The number of villages regularly 
calling volunteer days declines from a pre-tsunami level of 97% to 72% in 2007, with 
some rebound to 83% in 2009. For villages that called for volunteer days in both pair-
wise years, the average number of days called per month for those reporting also declines 
post-tsunami.  
 16 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
A concern is whether the village level measure of volunteerism, days called, 
reflects total volunteerism, given that participation in days called can vary. While 
volunteer days are typically half days starting in the morning, the actual hours can vary. 
Second, the fraction of adult males participating can vary. In 2009, we additionally asked 
the number of hours and number of volunteers in the most recent day called. In 2009, for 
155 villages reporting numbers, the mean and median number of hours called were 3.0; 
and the mean number of volunteers was 146, in a sample where the number of 
households per village averages 217. To see the correlation between the number of days 
called per month and the numbers of hours and of volunteers in the most recent of those 
days, we estimated a Poisson regression of number of days called on the log of 
participants and the log of hours separately. This gives coefficients (s.e.) respectively of -
0.031 (0.074) and 0.439** (0.135).
8
 These correlations alleviate later measurement 
concerns, such as village heads calling more volunteer days if they have low 
participation. If there is a bias in using our measure, it goes the other way. Increased 
volunteer days may understate increased volunteerism in the sense that village heads 
wanting and able to call more volunteer days also call longer hours. Note that this is 
consistent with the model, where more projects means more volunteerism overall. We do 
not have data on numbers of different volunteer projects overall nor those worked on in 
any volunteer session.  
(a) Formulation 
                                                 
8. A control for number of households in the village has no impact on the hours coefficient and for 
participants changes it to -0.015 (0.078). 
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We use a count formulation given the presence of zeroes; results are robust to other 
formulations (e.g., OLS or Tobit), as we will see. In a count formulation, total volunteer 
days 
jtV  in village j in time t are modelled as a function ( )jt t t jt jtV X E    , where 
jtX are village controls to be discussed, jtE  
is an indicator variable as to whether the 
village has had a formal election by time t, and 
jt is the error term. The error term 
includes district-time fixed effects, for the five districts and two time periods (2007 and 
2009), to capture cultural differentiation across the five districts and to allow for district-
level shocks. Since we pool years, we will cluster errors by village to allow for 
correlation over time. The probability of observing 
jtV volunteer days under the Poisson is 
/ ( !)jt jt
V
jt jte V



, where 
jt  is the expected number of volunteer days called per month in 
village j in time t. The common form for 
jt , which we adopt is 
                                                exp[ ]jt jt t t jtX E    ,            
which is convenient when defining elasticities. We use Wooldridge robust errors (to the 
Poisson assumption) for these equations.  
In estimation, our base sample is usually 187 of the 190 villages for which we 
have consistent data. We drop one village dominated by army housing, where reporting is 
not consistent on what population is covered, and two villages with no pre-tsunami 
government data on population. After that we have missing values on certain survival 
rates.  
(b) Basic results on elections 
In this section, we start by treating the timing of elections as “exogenous,” being driven 
by differential subdistrict priorities and capacities, rather than village level unobservables 
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affecting volunteerism. As such, election effects are regime-switch effects. Then we turn 
to evidence that supports this assumption. In the estimation, as noted, we control for a 
variety of village characteristics relating to size, diversity, survival and destruction from 
the tsunami, and village social capital, allowing for 2009 differential effects of each 
relative to 2007. We discuss the results on these characteristics in Section 3d.  
The key variable we focus on in this section is whether the village has had an 
election to date. This information is taken from the 2009 interviews, where we were 
careful in questioning to distinguish officially sanctioned elections from informal ones, 
typically held in the first two years after the tsunami, a distinction we will utilize below. 
For 2009, an election-to-date is whether the village has had an officially sanctioned 
election from early 2006 up to the date of interview in late 2009 or early 2010. For 2007, 
an election-to-date means that the village, when interviewed in a specific month in late 
2007 or early 2008, had an official election after 2005 but in or before that interview 
month in late 2007 or early 2008 (as reported in 2009).  
Table 4 contains the basic results. Column 1 contains just election-to-date and its 
differential effect in 2009, with the only control being a time effect. Those having 
switched regimes by having an election have 40.1% fewer volunteer days. The 
differential effect of an election to data on 2009 volunteer days is negative (suggesting a 
stronger effect) but insignificant; and that pattern holds in all columns in the table. In 
column 2 we add in district-year fixed effects, which reduce the effect to a 33.8% 
reduction. Column 3 adds in a full set of eight village characteristics, each with 2009 
differential effects, with a then 36.6% reduction in volunteerism. This is our preferred 
specification. 
 19 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
In columns 4–7 we do some robustness checks on the basic specification. In 
column 4, we add in a control for typical monthly pre-tsunami volunteer days as 
recollected by the villagers present at the interview. Obviously this measure has issues to 
do with both recollection inaccuracy and bias. But it is a control for pre-tsunami village 
tendencies, which could also be correlated with timing of elections, although, as we will 
see below, timing is uncorrelated with pre-tsunami volunteer days. The measure of pre-
tsunami volunteer days has little impact on the election-to-date coefficient and itself is 
insignificant. Column 5 adds in measures of the need for and extent of aid: the number of 
houses destroyed by the tsunami and the count of RAN projects. Coefficients on these 
(not shown) are completely insignificant and inclusion of these variables has no impact of 
the election-to-date coefficient. We also experimented with dropping the few villages in 
which the month of surveying was an election month; that left results from column 3 
unchanged (slightly strengthened). Column 6 estimates the specification in column 3 by 
Tobit with censoring at 0 volunteer days and the dependent variable being the log of 
volunteer days for those with days, which gives an election-to-date elasticity comparable 
to column 3. Tobit gives stronger effects. Column 7 estimates by OLS where the 
dependent variable is the count of volunteer days. There, an election-to-date lowers the 
number of volunteer days in 2007 by 0.462 from a mean of 1.51 (table A2), a 30.6% 
reduction, with stronger effects in 2009.  
(c) Identification.   
We now turn to the key analysis of identification, beyond examining election timing in 
and of itself. Threats to causality include the idea that the type of village head changes 
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because of the aid process (more educated), and effects reflect that, rather than a shift in 
regime per se. Or it could be that villages that had an election versus those that did not 
(by the end of 2009) are different and those differences drive the volunteerism 
differences. We now explore these issues looking at village head education, election 
timing and differential effects for elections at different times, and placebo elections. The 
experiments we carry out are reported in tables 5 and 6. We report one at a time. 
Village Head Education 
We start with the issue that elections generally bring in better-educated village heads, 
who might desire or only be able to muster fewer volunteer days. As a management style, 
they might want to produce public goods with fewer volunteer inputs per se. In table 5, a 
control in column 1 for whether the village head has a high school education or not has a 
zero effect in both years on volunteerism and no impact on the election magnitude 
compared to the base case in column 1. This suggests both that volunteerism is not 
different in villages with more educated heads and that village head education is not 
driving election results.  
TABLE 5 about HERE 
Election Timing 
The next issue concerns election timing and the comparison between villages with and 
without an election. First, we show that village observables generally don’t affect election 
timing. We show results for a proportional hazard model of the risk of having an election 
in year one (2006) through year five (2009), with either censoring or a 2010 date for all 
other villages (the strongly intended goal). For the hazard, we show the results for an 
exponential with all elections completed before 2011, but results on covariate coefficients 
 21 
for a censored or Weibull version are similar. We also estimate a Probit on having an 
election before the end of 2009 or not.   
In the hazard and the Probit estimations, in table 6, in columns (1) and (3), only 
one of the 18 coefficients (an arisan group pre-tsunami in the Probit) for village 
characteristics significantly affects election timing. We will discuss arisan groups in 
section 3d. Columns 2 and 4 show that additionally there is no partial correlation with 
pre-tsunami volunteer days. This is a pretty compelling case that village observables do 
not affect election timing. Table 2 also suggests reasonable balance in the data between 
villages that have an election before the end of 2009 versus not, and any imbalance seems 
to be offset by district fixed effects. These results indicate why we didn’t pursue IV work, 
for example instrumenting for elections with death of the village head. Those deaths only 
resulted in early informal elections, and didn’t affect the timing of formal elections. We 
struggled to find other predetermined conditions that had a significant influence and don’t 
report the many experiments which bore no fruit, including distance to Banda Aceh, 
village located on the seashore or not, female versus male survival rate, and whether the 
dominant occupation is fishing or farming. The timing of village elections seems 
unrelated to inherent measured village attributes, suggesting a strong random component 
to election timing.  
TABLE 6 HERE OR JUST ABOVE 
Although observables don’t influence election timing, there must be village 
unobservables affecting timing, so that it is not entirely imposed from the outside. While 
reforms mandated local elections, in many villages formal elections were delayed, with 
elites remaining in control. Formal elections must be certified and approved by the 
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subdistrict (kecamatan) government. Given the mandate to hold elections, what affected 
the timing of elections after early 2006? Interviews with local election official suggested 
many factors that are exogenous to specific villages: subdistrict priorities (in a time of 
massive aid delivery) and capacities to monitor and authorize elections. In our village 
survey, we asked the key cited reasons for what prompted a post-tsunami election, 
allowing for multiple factors, although mostly one factor was cited. First are pressure 
from the subdistrict or district government (55 of 150 cases) and village head died in the 
tsunami (35 cases). We thought complaints from villagers about the aid delivery process 
would be important, but that appears to be incorrect. In only four (of 150) cases did 
villages report that aid disputes of any type prompted the election; and only six report 
that aid allocations issues were the main election issue. Another set of about 25 villages 
stated incompetence, forced to resign, and been head too long. There are also 61 villages, 
which say that the head (or any replacement) had simply completed his term, but this 
seems to be a more polite phrasing of “been head too long”.9 These last types of 
responses raise issues such as “been head too long” implies disgruntlement, which could 
affect volunteerism.    
It should be clear we are not claiming election timing is exogenous to all village 
conditions. We instead argue that unobservables affecting volunteerism don’t affect 
timing of elections, using three pieces of evidence. First, we show the election effect is 
the same regardless of election timing. While that does not prove the final set of villages 
(those with elections yet to come after 2009) are different than all other villages, it is 
                                                 
9. We have some information on dates of pre-tsunami elections, with a wave of about 65 elections in 2000–
03 after national democratization in 1999. It seems that these were informal elections. Indeed, if they were 
formal with the proscribed time between elections, they should have had new elections in 2005–09. The 
overlap between this 65 and the 61 citing term completed is only 25. 
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strong evidence for regime switch effects. Whatever unobservables differentiate whether 
elections are held in the years from 2006 through 2009, they have no effect on election 
coefficients. Second, and related, we show that “placebo elections” have no effect. Third, 
we will introduce village fixed effects to control for all village conditions, but to do so we 
must take seriously the information on pre-tsunami volunteerism. 
For election timing, we can distinguish overall effects for 2007 and 2009 
volunteerism from elections in 2006 (13%) and post 2007 (16%)
10
 versus no elections by 
the end of surveying in 2009 (31%). The base case where elections are held in 2007 
accounts for 39% of villages. Table 5, column 2 relative to the 2007 election base effect 
on volunteerism in 2007 shows differential effects of: 2007 elections on 2009 
volunteerism, 2006 elections on volunteerism in 2007 and 2009, and 2008/09 elections on 
volunteerism in 2007 (a placebo effect) and in 2009. None of these differentials are 
significant, nor is the election-to-date coefficient noticeably changed. Any unobservables 
driving more precise election timing are not driving the effects of elections on 
volunteerism.   
 
 
Placebo Elections 
A negative regime-switch effect of elections should only occur for formally mandated 
elections. To explore this further we note that 24% of our villages called informal 
elections after the tsunami, usually because the village head was killed in the tsunami or 
quit office and was temporarily replaced by villagers in an informal election. An informal 
                                                 
10. These are elections actually held in 2008 or 2009. This differs from the higher fraction of villages 
whose first election was after surveying in 2007. 
 24 
election is defined by a village that reports a post-tsunami election in 2007 but not in 
2009 or reports an election in 2005 prior to election reforms. In the survey and 
instructions, elections reported in 2009 were supposed to be formal, sanctioned ones. In 
2007 that distinction was not made. Again, our presumption is that these unmonitored 
elections were dominated by elites. We first examined balance in the data for villages 
with and without informal elections, looking for significant differences in the mean of 
village characteristics listed in table 7 below for those with and without informal 
elections; no characteristics are significantly different across the two groups. These 
elections have no effect on volunteerism in either 2007 or 2009, as seen in column 3 of 
table 5 (note the net effect in 2009 is insignificant). We also ran a version where we 
narrow the comparison to whether these placebo elections had any effect on volunteerism 
in 2007 among just the sample of villages that had no formal elections before surveying 
in 2007. About 45% of these villages had informal elections. Again there are no effects; 
the informal elections coefficient is -0.076. 
Village Fixed Effects 
Finally we turn to village fixed effects in table 5 column 4. For elections, the issue is that 
villages yet to have elections by the end of 2007 or 2009 may have had a history of 
greater volunteerism pre-tsunami driven by unobservables, and that history could be 
driving results despite all the controls we use to try to capture village effects. Pre-tsunami 
versus 2009, villages with elections experienced a 44% drop in volunteer days, while 
those without only had a 31% drop. If we impose village fixed effects to try to control for 
the unobservables, what happens? Before answering that we note there are two issues 
with such a specification. First, imposing fixed effects assumes village characteristics 
 25 
have the same effects over time (in 2007 versus 2009, or pre-tsunami) on volunteerism. 
As table 7 shows below, for village observables this is clearly not the case in our context, 
in which case fixed effects is arguably a misspecification. Second, to get identification, 
we must pool the three years of data on volunteerism (pre-tsunami, 2007, and 2009), 
using a Poisson model with year and village fixed effects. We need the three years 
because most elections occur before surveying in 2007, and we can’t identify just off of 
elections that occur in 2008 and 2009. The issue in adding in the third year is that pre-
tsunami days are based on recall about what was typical, which might be influenced by 
the response to current volunteerism. With these caveats in mind, in column 4 of table 5, 
the fixed effects estimator has an election effect of -0.27, a still strong effect, although 
smaller than those we found in different specifications in the same row.  
(d) Controls in the basic specification 
The tables contain numerous controls that relate to destruction, aid, and social 
capital. Here we examine effects conditional on all other controls. We focus the 
discussion on our preferred specification, column 3 of table 4. Table 7 shows the village 
controls, base coefficients, and 2009 differentials for this specification. Some controls 
significantly affect volunteerism in 2007, but no net effects are significant in 2009, a key 
result. We treat the controls as at least pre-determined relative to late 2007 and some as 
completely exogenous, as we will note in each case.   
TABLE 7 HERE  
Two standard controls in the literature are village size, or the number of 
households post-tsunami, and village diversity. Size could reduce volunteerism by 
aggravating free-rider problems and increased diversity could reduce cohesiveness and 
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raise the psychic costs of volunteering (Alesina and LaFerrara 2000, Costa and Kahn, 
2003). Village size post-tsunami is recorded in 2005 from the PODES, before households 
may later split to strategically garner more housing aid. Diversity is measured from our 
survey in 2007. Villagers are not diverse in ethnicity or race, but there is occupational 
diversity of households. We form the index 
9
2
1
1 ij
j
s

 , where 2ijs  is the squared share of 
employment in occupation j across 9 occupations in village i.
11
 In 2007 in table 7, 
increased size does reduce volunteerism consistent with free rider problems with an 
elasticity of -0.258 in 2007 in column 1, although the net effect is smaller and 
insignificant in 2009 (from combining columns 1 and 2). Diversity has the anticipated 
negative sign in both tables but is statistically weak. 
 We then turn to a set of variables that could be interpreted as measures of social 
capital, although they may have other channels of influence. Greater social capital should 
reduce the psychic costs of volunteering (Sobel 2002, Getler, Bellows, and Miguel, 
2009). Foremost in our data is the pre-tsunami existence or not of a rotating saving and 
credit association (RoSCA), called arisan group. Such groups, usually composed of 
women who meet regularly, with each member contributing a fixed sum to a pot and then 
taking the pot on a rotating schedule. Arisan groups are a volunteer association outside 
the mosque and governance structure. While the original work was on RoSCA’s role in 
alleviating credit market imperfections (Besley, Coate, and Loury 1994), empirical work 
suggests a strong social component, with participation rising with wealth and 
complementing rather than substituting for credit institutions, at least in Indonesia 
(Varadharajan 2004). We view the existence of an arisan group as an indicator of a 
                                                 
11. Occupations with their average shares are: fishing (28%), aquaculture (5%), agriculture (29%), trade 
(8%), transport (4%), construction (6%), public service (9%), other (6%), and unemployed (6%). 
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higher level of social capital and spirit of mutual assistance pre-tsunami. In 2005, male 
villagers repeatedly identified women as the social “glue” which facilitated village unity 
and purpose. 68% of our villages report the existence of an arisan group pre-tsunami.
12
 
Clearly the treatment effect here is not to say, if one randomly formed an arisan group 
pre-tsunami, that would give the effect we see. It is the pre-tsunami conditions in the 
village, which led to the formation of an arisan group, that we are trying to represent—
the village social capital. 
The control has a positive effect in 2007, as the literature suggests, with the pre-
tsunami existence of an arisan group pre-tsunami increasing volunteer days by 30%. A 
surprise is that by 2009 in table 7, the arisan group effect is close to zero. This goes 
against the spirit of persistence of social capital effects found in the growth literature 
(e.g., Guiso Sapienza and Zingales 2008 and Tabelini 2008). But our context is unusual. 
Survivors in villages were disproportionately prime adult males, so there was widespread 
new family formation, investment in family life, and a restructuring of village female 
networks (Alesini and Giuliano 2009 and Ermisch and Gurr 2008). Villages transformed 
physically and socially, potentially weakening the value of pre-tsunami social capital.  
There are additional controls, which could be interpreted as relating to social 
capital. They all have to do with destruction and would then be interpreted as measuring 
greater or less destruction of social capital. That idea is in contrast to the notion that 
destruction could also be a rallying point for villagers, so that more trauma leads to more 
volunteerism (Bellows and Miguel 2009 and Zylberberg 2010). First consider survival or 
                                                 
12. We asked about other social capital indicators also dominated by women such as Quran recitation 
groups and PKK groups, but almost all villages report such activities both pre-and post tsunami, so there is 
effectively no village level variation. In addition, Quran recitation is a religious activity sponsored by the 
mosque, and PKK groups are sponsored by the national government offering “guidance for family and 
welfare” and have political-social overtones, not mutual assistance ones. 
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not of the key village spiritual leader, the mullah. Survival of the mullah (65% in table 
A2) may play a key role in fostering a sense of purpose, community, and continuity, 
especially (from fieldwork) in the months immediately following the tsunami. Mullah 
survival could be interpreted as triggering the social capital reserves of the village, as 
opposed to the villagers rallying together in the face of the death of their mullah. Mullah 
survival has a strong positive effect in 2007, increasing volunteer days by 36%; but that 
effect is gone by 2009. This would be consistent with the idea that in the more immediate 
post-tsunami period the mullah was a force to draw villagers together to undertake social 
projects. 
The other variables concern the survival of the village head, another potential 
leader, and survival of the overall population. Village head survival has seemingly oddly 
a negative, although a statistically weak effect, which is gone by 2009. The initial 
negative could have several explanations: traditional heads faced strong strains in terms 
of the coming democratization and were also often overwhelmed post-tsunami, feeling 
personal responsibility to get villages back on their feet. Village population survival hints 
at positive effects in 2007 consistent with the social capital story but not the rallying one 
in Bellows and Miguel (2009). However there is no effect in 2009.   
Then there are controls relating to survival and destruction of public buildings that 
are generally maintained by the village: great and regular mosques, village halls, 
fishermen’s halls, and Islamic schools. Survival, relative to obtaining a brand new 
building through aid, could create a demand for public labor. In table 7, we see no 
effects; nor, less surprisingly, does the destruction rate of housing have effects.  
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In table 4 column 5, as noted above, we experimented with adding a measure of 
the extent of aid projects in the village. For the latter, most aid in our villages is complete 
by late 2007, so we were asking mostly whether predetermined aid activity affects 
volunteerism, not whether the arrival of aid today has a contemporaneous effect on 
volunteer days. Our aid measure is the total number of aid projects in the village. The 
literature suggests that more projects would create higher opportunity costs of 
volunteering and greater incentives to spend time lobbying for aid (Svennson 2000 and 
Labonne and Chase 2008). Knack and Rahman (2007) argue that having more donors 
erodes local bureaucratic quality and capacity, which could reduce villagers’ incentives to 
volunteer. Here we suggest that the village head may be distracted, and volunteer days 
may not be well planned or may be put off.
13
 Regardless, there are no effects: coefficients 
(s.e.) on the count of RAN projects and the 2009 differential are respectively -0.0061 
(.0050) and 0.0038 (0.0075).  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of a new institution, elections for village head, is associated with 
reduced volunteerism in villages. Old village heads were long-term heads chosen by and 
from village elites. New heads may represent more the choices for the median voter. The 
reduction in volunteer days seems to occur largely because these different types of village 
heads chosen under different regimes choose different numbers of projects requiring 
volunteer labor.  
                                                 
13. A key issue in interpreting aid effects concerns whether villages with unobserved tendencies to 
volunteer days attract differential aid. Henderson and Lee (2014) show that the level of house aid seems 
uncorrelated with any observed measures of leadership survival, social capital, elections, or the overall 
RAN count of aid projects in a village. House aid, at least, seems driven by need and supply conditions 
(like access of NGO’s to the village and extent of destruction). 
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DATA APPENDIX 
The Surveys 
The village surveys in summer and fall 2005, fall 2007, and fall 2009 ask questions about 
education, experience, and survival of village and religious leaders; population 
composition by sex and age both before and after the tsunami; migration; occupational 
structure; destruction of village lands, seawalls, aquaculture areas, docking areas and 
mangroves; pre- and post-tsunami data on political, legal, and social institutions; pre and 
post tsunami information on physical capital (houses, boats, public buildings); detailed 
information on initial and ongoing operations of NGO’s, local governments, and relief 
agencies providing housing, boats, public buildings, and restoration of the coast line; and 
detailed information on the village fishing industry pre- and post-tsunami, including 
questions on marketing, fishing fleet composition, catch composition and boat 
replacement. The 2005 survey of 111 villages focused on benchmarking destruction and 
village conditions. The 2007 and 2009 surveys of 199 villages (including the original 
111) focused on aspects of the aid effort and institutional transformation of villages, such 
as the democratic evolution and quality of aid as related to different types of aid agencies.  
 
Geographic Coverage 
Overall, in terms of village coverage, we cover all villages in three contiguous districts 
(Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Besar) going south and north-east of the capital 
Banda Aceh, as well as off-shore islands of these districts. We also covered fishing 
villages in two other districts, up to a defined geographic limit moving east from Banda 
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Aceh into Pidie (the last subdistrict surveyed is Meurah Dua) and moving south into 
Aceh Barat (the last subdistrict surveyed is Meuruebo).  
FIGURE A1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure A1 shows a map of the survey area, with a blow-up (right side in figure) of the 
Banda Aceh area (upper-left part of coastal area). The map shows household survival 
rates by village (yellow being the worst). Unfortunately, the map is based on the 
government rendering, post-tsunami, of village boundaries. In that dimension the map is 
grossly inaccurate. We took GPS readings of the center (the mosque) of the living area of 
each village. In only 6% of the cases is that GPS reading within the village boundaries. In 
15% of the cases, it is over 10 kilometers away. Coastal villages are drawn as non-coastal 
and vice-versa which explains why, in parts of the map, a yellow (low survival) village 
may be shown next to a supposed coastal village, which is dark (high survival). 
Nevertheless the map pictures the general survey area. 
 
The Survey Area 
Sources of Population and Building Stock Numbers 
To cover our villages consistently, for pre- and post-tsunami populations of villages, we 
use government counts. For the 88 villages added to our survey after 2005, 2007 recall of 
pre-tsunami populations tended to be strategic or unreliable (the village head reporting 
those numbers is usually new to office). Official population counts pre-tsunami are from 
the P4B, a 2004 government pre-election census. The official survival rate is the 2006 
PODES count divided by the count in P4B. The PODES is a tri-annual government 
inventory of village populations and facilities. The 2006 PODES in Aceh was conducted 
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in the Spring 2005. For eight villages, the PODES post-tsunami count grossly 
undercounts households, where for example the number of households in our 2009 
survey is more than fivefold the PODES count. The ratios are 11, 7.5, 312, 23, 50, 21, 5.2 
and 6.9. The absolute counts are just too low. In two of the eight cases where we have 
2005 data, our survey counts versus the PODES are 212 versus 80 and 136 versus 20. Not 
surprisingly, we get slightly sharper size and survival results if we drop these 
observations, but they do not affect election results. 
For house and public building counts before and after the tsunami, we use our survey 
numbers (and there are not reliable government numbers); what was destroyed is well 
recorded by the remaining foundations, as well as village mapping exercises conducted 
soon after the tsunami. For survival rate of the mullah and village head, we use 2005 
numbers with 2007 numbers for our added villages. Given that the deaths of prominent 
figures are known to all villagers, we are not so worried about recall here.  
{Table A.1 about here} 
{Table A.2 about here} 
 
 
 33 
 
 
 34 
REFERENCES 
Alesina A., and E. La Ferrara. 2000. “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 847–904. 
Alesina A., and P. Giuliano. 2009. “Family Ties and Political Participation.” Technical 
report.  
Andreoni J. 1993. “An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out 
Hypothesis.” American Economic Review 83, 1317–27.  
Azam, J-P., and J-J. Laffont. 2003. “Contracting for Aid.” Journal of Development 
Economics 70, 25–58. 
Bardhan, P. 2000. “Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation 
Communities in South India.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 48, 
847–65. 
Bellows J., and E. Miguel. 2009. “War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone,” 
Journal of Public Economics” 96, 394–99. 
Besley, T., S. Coate, and G. Loury. 1994. “Rotating Credit and Savings Associations, 
Credit Markets, and Economic Efficiency.” Review of Economic Studies, 701–19. 
Collier, P., P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont, and J.W. Gunning. 1997. “Redesigning 
Conditionality.” World Development 25, 1399–1407.  
Costa D. L., and M. E. Kahn. 2003. “Understanding the American Decline in Social 
Capital, 1952–1998.” Kyklos 56 (1): 17–46. 
Dal Bo, P., A. Foster, and L. Putterman. 2010. “Institutions and Behavior: Experimental 
Evidence on the Effects of Democracy.” American Economic Review 100 (5): 
2205–29. 
Easterley, W. 2003. “The Cartel of Good Intentions: the Problem of Bureaucracy in 
Foreign Aid.” Journal of Policy Reform 5 (4): 1–28. 
Ermisch J., and T. R. Gurr. 2008. “Do Strong Family Ties Inhibit Trust.” ISER working 
paper 2008–37. 
Evers, P. 2000. “Resourceful Villagers, Powerless Communities (Rural Village 
Government in Indonesia.” World Bank / Bappenas Local Level Institutions. 
Draft report. 
Foster, A. and M. Rosenzweig. 2005. “Democratization and the Distribution of Local 
Public Goods in a Poor Rural Economy.” Mimeo. Department of Economics, 
Brown University.  
Getler, P., D. Levine, and E. Miguel. 2006. “Does industrialization build or destroy social 
networks.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 54 (2): 287–317. 
Guiso L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales. 2008. “Long Term Persistence,” NBER Working 
Paper 14278. 
 35 
Henderson J. V., and A. Kuncoro. 2011. “Corruption and Local Democratization in Indonesia: 
The Role of Islamic Parties.” Journal of Development Economics 94, 164–80. 
Henderson, J. V., and Y. Lee. 2014. “The Organization of Aid Delivery: Spending Your 
Donations.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, forthcoming. 
Kanbur R., and T. Sandler. 1999. “The Future of Development Assistance: Common 
Pools and International Public Goods.” ODC Policy Essay #25, Overseas 
Development Council, Washington. 
Knack, S., and A. Rahman. 2007. “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid 
Recipients” Journal of Development Economics, 83, 176–97.  
Labonne, J., and R. Chase. 2008. “Do Community Driven Development Projects Improve 
Local Governance and Enhance Social Capital: Evidence from the Philippines.” 
World Bank mimeo. 
Martinez-Bravo, M. 2011. “The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: 
Evidence from Indonesia.” SAIS mimeo. 
Martinez-Bravo, M., G. Padró-i-Miquel, N. Qian, and Y. Yao. 2011. “Do Local 
Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from 
Rural China.” NBER WP# 16948.  
Munshi, K., and M. Rosenzweig. 2010. “Networks, Commitment and Competence: Caste 
in Local Indian Politics.” http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Kaivan_Munshi/. 
Murrell, P. 2002. “The Interaction of Donors, Contractors, and Recipients in 
Implementing Aid for Institutional Reform,” in B. Martens, U. Mummert, P. 
Murrell, and P. Seabright, eds., The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid, 
Cambridge U. Press, 69–111. 
Olken B., and M. Siyokal. 2011. “Informal Taxation.” American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 3, 1–28. 
Paul, E. 2006. “A Survey of the Theoretical Economic Literature on Foreign Aid,” Asian-
Pacific Economic Literature 20 (1). 
Pedersen, K. 2001. “The Samaritan’s Dilemna and the Effectiveness of Development 
Aid.” International Tax and Public Finance 8, 693–703. 
Putnam, R. D. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” The Journal 
of Democracy 6 (1): 65–78. 
Sobel, J. 2002. “Can We Trust Social Capital.” Journal of Economic Literature 40, 130-
154.  
Svennson, J. 2000. “Foreign Aid and Rent- Seeking.” Journal of International Economics 
51, 437–61. 
———. 2003. “Why Conditional Aid Does Not Work and What Can Be Done About It?” 
Journal of Development Economics 70 (2): 381–42. 
Tabelini G. 2008. “The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentive,” Quarterly Journal 
Of Economics 123, 905–50.    
 36 
Torsvik, G. 2005. “Foreign Economic Aid: Should Donors Cooperate.” Journal of 
Development Economics 77, 503–15. 
Varadharajan, S. 2004. “Explaining Participation in RoSCAs: Evidence from Indonesia”, 
Cornell University, 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/content/article/detail/23451. 
Zylberberg Y. 2010. “Do Tropical Typhoons Smash Community Ties? Theory and 
Evidence from Vietnam.” Paris School of Economics processed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE IS MISSING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Map of Survey Area 
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Figure 1. Equilibrium Relationship in the Model 
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Table A1. Timeline on Tsunami and Village Surveys 
Event Date Notes 
Tsunami 12/26/2004  
Field work trips 04, 05 and 06 2005 2 people for 15 days; and then 6 people for about 15 days 
First survey 09/16/05–12/22/05 92 of 112 completed by 10/15/05. Rest were down the 
coast and very hard to reach (road destroyed). Surveying 
interrupted in October by Ramadan.  
Field work 05 and 06 2007 6 people for about 2 weeks and then 3 people for about 2 
weeks. [Also 1 person for about a month in late 2007.] 
Second survey 03/08/07–12/22/2007 Surveying interrupted in September by Ramadan  
Field work 08 2009  7 people for about 3 weeks 
Third survey 30/09/09–04/02/2010 Surveying delayed to end of September by Ramadan. 186 
completed by mid-February 
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Table A 2. Stats on Village Characteristics and Balance in the Data (Estimating Sample 
of 187) 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Difference in means: no 
election by 2009 minus 
rest. T-stats 
Ln(no. of households post-tsunami) 4.85 0.78 3.04 7.73 0.90 
Survival rate of population 0.75 0.48 0.11 3.72 2.13 
Mullah survives tsunami 0.65 0.48 0 1 2.20 
Village head survived tsunami 0.76 0.43 0 1 1.88 
Arisan group 0.68 0.47 0 1 1.95 
Diversity index 0.60 0.18 0.096 1 0.27 
No. of public bldg. destroyed 3.65 1.76 0 9 -0.94 
No. of public bldg. survive 0.58 0.75 0 4 1.22 
Vol. days/month pre-tsunami 2.58 1.51 0 8 2.10 
Volunteer days in 2007 1.52 1.46 0 4 n.a. 
Volunteer days in 2009 1.56 1.35 0 5 n.a. 
District (5) fixed effects   
6.36, 2.14, -2.91, 
-0.24, -3.44 
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Table 1. Destruction of Population and Housing 
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Min Max N 
Survival of population (based on government 
numbers) 
0.75 0.45 0.11 3.7 188 
Pre-tsunami population  853 901 100 7103 188 
Post-tsunami households, official  177 197 20 1516 190 
      
House aid (2009)      
Number of houses survived tsunami, survey 26 112 0 1354 176 
Survival rate houses 0.097 0.23 0 0.97 176 
Number of permanent aid houses built  200 215 0 2177 190 
Replacement rate by late 2009
a
   1.57 1.84 0 20.8 190 
      
Other aid information (2009):       
Survival rate public buildings 
b 
 0.16 0.23 0 1 190 
Replacement rate, public buildings 1.00 0.82 0 5.25 190 
Number of different NGO’s as first level 
implementers in RAND in the village 
11.0 5.50 1 37 187 
Number of different projects (first level 
implementations) in RAND in the village 
31.8 16.2 1 106 189 
a. The replacement rate is the number of houses given in aid divided by the number of surviving 
households less the number of surviving houses. Treats missing values on survival as zeros for 14 
cases for this calculation.  
b. Includes mosques, village halls, fishermen halls, public and Islamic elementary schools, and health 
facilities. 
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Table 2. Elections and Old Village Heads 
 Percentages 
Post-tsunami elections before end of 2007   [N=190] 47.4 
Post-tsunami elections before end of 2009   [N=190] 70.5 
  
No. of village heads who survive         (out of 199)  76.4 
If survive: in office at end of 2009       (22 out of 152 survivors; [out of 199]) 15.5  [11.8] 
                & reelected  post-tsunami       (5 out of 22 still in office; [out of 199]) 22.7  [2.5] 
  
% village heads with high school, pre-tsunami  46.7 
% village heads with high school in 2009       (out of 199) 62.3 
% old village heads with high school in 2009 (out of 22 survivors in office) 36.4 
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Table 3. Public Labor: Volunteerism 
 Pre-
tsunami 
2007 2009 Sample t-stat. on 
differences 
Proportion with regular volunteer 
days  
.97 .72 .83 190 villages 05-07   07-09 
-6.94    2.70  
Avg. volunteer days per month 
(days in both years) 
2.78 2.14  138 villages   -4.7 
 2.19 2.01 120 villages -1.25 
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Table 4. Basic election results 
 Poisson count  Tobit OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
     
 
  
Election-to-date  -0.401*** -0.338** -0.366** -0.348** -0.371** -0.546* -0.462** 
 
(0.140) (0.151) (0.155) (0.156) (0.153) (0.289) (0.215) 
Election-to-date  * year 2009 -0.049 -0.115 -0.091 -0.108 -0.064 -0.297 -0.281 
 
(0.171) (0.178) (0.186) (0.189) (0.187) (0.349) (0.289) 
Ln(vol days/mon, pre-tsun.)    0.188    
    (0.147)    
Ln(vol days/mon, pre-    0.007    
   tsun.)*year 2009    (0.190)    
Base covariates, Base  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   covariates * year 2009 
 
      
Year fixed effects Yes No No No 
 
No 
No No 
Aid controls and aid 
controls*year 2009
a
 
No No No No 
 
Yes No No 
District (5) *year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sigma 
    
 1.487*** 
 
     
 (0.067) 
 
Number of observations 374 374 374 374 372 374 374 
Adjusted R
2
      0.077 0.185 
Log-Likelihood -599.78 -569.37 -556.10 -554.41 -550.2 -602.37 -604.73 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
  
 
 
a. These are the count of RAND projects in the village and no. of houses destroyed by the tsunami. And each interacted 
with a dummy for the year of 2009 
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Table 5. Robustness 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Election-to-date  -0.366** -0.393** -0.415*** -0.269* 
 
(0.158) (0.173) (0.160) (0.146) 
Village head high school plus -0.0005  
 
 
 
(0.138)  
 
 Village election in 2006 
 
0.156  
 
  
(0.229)  
 Village election in 2008 or 2009 
 
0.062  
 
  
(0.188)  
 Informal election 
 
 -0.147 
 
  
 (0.137) 
 Year 2009 X Election-to-date  -0.076 -0.172 0.015 0.128 
 
(0.191) (0.215) (0.200) (0.179) 
Year 2009 X Village head high school plus -0.166   
 
 
(0.180)   
 Year 2009 X Village election in 2006 
 
0.116  
 
  
(0.286)  
 Year 2009 X Village election in 2008 or 2009 
 
0.120  
 
  
(0.247)  
 Year 2009 X Informal election 
  
0.385** 
 
   
(0.182) 
 District (5) * year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No 
Village (190) fixed effects No No No Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No Yes 
Base controls Yes Yes Yes No 
Base controls* year 2009 Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of observations 374 374 374 590 
Log-Likelihood -555.3 -554.8 -554.2 -481.3 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Election Timing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Proportional Hazard 
Probit: Election by end of 2009 
or not 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
   
  
Ln(no. of households post-tsunami) 0.073 0.073 0.317* 0.316* 
 
(0.078) (0.077) (0.164) (0.164) 
Survival rate of population 0.136 0.140 0.194 0.197 
 
(0.098) (0.096) (0.264) (0.263) 
Pre-tsunami arisan group -0.207 -0.207 -0.566** -0.565** 
 
(0.140) (0.140) (0.256) (0.257) 
Mullah survives tsunami -0.144 -0.144 -0.378 -0.377 
 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.254) (0.254) 
Village head died from tsunami 0.115 0.111 0.228 0.226 
 
(0.143) (0.143) (0.304) (0.303) 
Diversity index -0.126 -0.131 -0.485 -0.484 
 
(0.259) (0.261) (0.584) (0.584) 
No. of public bldg. destroyed 0.019 0.019 0.028 0.028 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.076) (0.076) 
No. of public bldg. survive 0.066 0.063 0.033 0.031 
 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.161) (0.161) 
Ln(vol. days/month pre-tsunami)  -0.041  -0.025 
  (0.118)  (0.245) 
District (5) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 187 187 187 187 
Log-Likelihood -862.7 -862.6 -86.6 -86.6 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Effects of Village Characteristics 
 
Base 
coefficient  
Year 2009 
differential 
 (1) (2) 
   
Ln(no. of households post-tsunami) -0.258*** 0.143 
 (0.088) (0.116) 
Diversity index -0.075 -0.457 
 (0.313) (0.455) 
Pre-tsunami arisan group 0.299* -0.212 
 (0.174) (0.216) 
Mullah survives tsunami 0.356*** -0.413** 
 (0.132) (0.178) 
Village head survived tsunami -0.274* 0.150 
 (0.150) (0.183) 
Survival rate of population 0.159* -0.250* 
 (0.092) (0.132) 
No. of public bldg. destroyed -0.004 -0.020 
 (0.043) (0.056) 
No. of public bldg. survive 0.016 0.081 
 (0.095) (0.128) 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
       
 
 
 
